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Abstract
In Southern European countries, the regularisations of irregular migrants have very fre-
quently been used as ex post control policy measures. They have often been blamed by a 
large number of scholars for their incapacity to stop the reproduction of irregular migration 
systems. Nevertheless, the debate on the effectiveness of regularisation programmes still 
demonstrates a substantial contradiction between the criticism of regularisations and the 
lack of empirical evidence in favour of or against the execution of such processes. The aim 
of the present article is to analyze the effects of regularisations in Italy and Spain as the two 
countries that have regularised the largest number of migrants in Europe. The final goal of 
the article is not only to assess the efficiency of regularisations but also to discuss the future 
of such measures in the Mediterranean migration regimes.
Key words: irregular migration; regularisation processes; informal economy; Spain; Italy.
Resum. La regularització d’immigrants irregulars a Espanya i a Itàlia: determinants i efectes
Sovint, en els països del sud d’Europa, la regularització d’immigrants irregulars s’ha emprat 
com a política migratòria de control aplicada a posteriori. Molts investigadors ho critiquen 
per la incapacitat que manifesta de parar la reproducció de sistemes de migració irregular. 
Malgrat tot, el debat sobre l’efectivitat d’aquests programes segueix demostrant l’existència 
d’una contradicció fonamental entre aquestes crítiques i la manca d’evidències empíriques 
a favor o en contra dels processos de regularització. L’objectiu principal d’aquest article 
és analitzar els efectes de les regularitzacions a Itàlia i a Espanya, els països europeus on 
més immigrants s’han vist beneficiats per aquestes regularitzacions. La finalitat de l’article 
és avaluar l’eficàcia d’aquestes polítiques, però també plantejar quin futur té aquest tipus 
de mesures en els règims migratoris mediterranis.
Paraules clau: immigració irregular; procés de regularització; economia submergida; 
Espa nya; Itàlia.
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Resumen. La regularización de inmigrantes irregulares en España e Italia: determinantes y 
efectos
Con frecuencia, la regularización de inmigrantes irregulares ha sido usada en los países del 
sur de Europa como política migratoria de control aplicada a posteriori. Muchos inves-
tigadores las han criticado por su incapacidad de parar la reproducción de sistemas de 
migración irregular. Sin embargo, el debate sobre la efectividad de dichos programas sigue 
demostrando la existencia de una contradicción fundamental entre estas críticas y la falta de 
evidencias empíricas a favor o en contra de los procesos de regularización. El objetivo prin-
cipal del presente artículo es analizar los efectos de las regularizaciones en Italia y España, 
los países europeos donde más inmigrantes se han visto beneficiados por ellas. La finalidad 
del artículo es evaluar la eficacia de estas políticas, pero también plantear qué futuro tiene 
este tipo de medidas en los regímenes migratorios mediterráneos. 
Palabras clave: inmigración irregular; proceso de regularización; economía sumergida; 
España; Italia.
Résumé. La régularisation des immigrants irréguliers en Espagne et en Italie: causes et effets
La régularisation des immigrants irréguliers a fréquemment été utilisée par les pays du Sud 
de l’Europe comme politique migratoire de contrôle appliquée a posteriori. De nombreux 
chercheurs l’ont critiquée car elle est incapable de mettre un terme à la reproduction des sys-
tèmes migratoires irréguliers. Cependant, le débat incessant sur l’efficacité des programmes 
de régularisation montre qu’il existe une contradiction fondamentale entre ces critiques et 
l’absence de preuves empiriques qui confirment ou invalident ces programmes. Le principal 
objectif de cet article est d’analyser les effets de la régularisation en Espagne et en Italie car 
ce sont les deux pays européens qui ont le plus pratiqué ce type de politique. Le but de cet 
article n’est pas seulement d’évaluer l’efficacité de ces mesures, mais aussi d’exposer leur 
avenir dans les régimes migratoires méditerranéens.
Mots clé: immigration irrégulière; processus de régularisation; économie irrégulière; 
Espagne; Italie.
Introduction
Is the regularisation of irregular immigrants a reasonable policy tool? Since the 
1990s, regularisations have been one of the most controversial policy measures 
in the political and scholarly debate on irregular migration. In the last 30 years, 
almost all European countries have carried out a regularisation processes (De 
Bruycker & Apap, 2000). However, the political background and the way 
they are implemented vary between countries. Although Southern European 
countries have regularised the largest number of immigrants in Europe, recent 
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research has highlighted that regularisations are not just a Southern European 
phenomenon. For instance, Northern European countries have regularised 
‘old’ cases of asylum-seekers and refugees on an individual basis. In this case, 
applicants usually had to meet certain conditions such as having a secure finan-
cial income or, at least, the prospect of a job. In Southern Europe, by contrast, 
regularisations are usually carried out as mass processes in which immigrants 
without a residence permit are regularised. This type of regularisation has 
always been sharply criticised by Northern EU Member States since their 
frequency and dimension is taken as a further proof of Southern European’s 
«public ambiguity» towards irregular migration, confirming their incapacity 
to control immigration flows (Brochmann, 1993; Baldwin-Edwards, 1999). 
Criticisms to regularisation processes are strongly related to scepticism 
about their efficiency. For instance, it is generally agreed that regularisations 
fail to elicit the whole eligible population and that they trigger the expectation 
of a more or less imminent regularisation, attracting an increasing number of 
irregular migrants rather than limiting their numbers (OECD, 2000). In addi-
tion, it is assumed that regularised migrants usually fall back into irregularity 
once their residence permit has expired because they are unable to renew their 
residence permit in time (Reyneri, 1999). Finally, it is also generally assumed 
that a considerable number of regularised immigrants continue to work in the 
informal economy despite having obtained a regular residence permit through 
a regularisation process (Zincone, 2004). As Papademetriou et al. (2004: 31) 
argue, «evidence is meager and provides only spotty support for the benefi-
cial labour market effects of regularisations.» At the European level, the EU 
Commission has repeatedly had a sceptical attitude towards such measures 
(COM/2004/412/def). In addition, some European countries clearly withdrew 
from regularisations in other Member States. After the 2002 Italian regularisa-
tion, representatives of certain Members States attempted to exclude regular-
ised immigrants from the categories encompassed by the European directive 
on long-term residents from third-countries (2003/109/EC). Furthermore, in 
2005, both the German and Dutch governments sharply criticised the deci-
sion by the Spanish government to carry out a mass regularisation of irregular 
immigrants. The same government was also blamed for not having informed 
its fellow EU Member States about the process in an adequate timeframe. 
In particular, German and Dutch criticism was fuelled by a widespread fear 
that regularised immigrants in Spain would invade other EU Member States, 
attracted by their generous welfare systems (El País 14/05/2005).
Other scholars, however, have pointed to some positive effects of regu-
larisations, recognising that such processes can improve social security cash 
inflows and provide information on the scale of irregular and informal employ-
ment (Papadopoulou, 2005). In addition, the importance of regularisations 
as correction mechanisms in combination with other policy measures has also 
been highlighted (Pastore, 2004). In this respect, the European Commission 
has recently published a very comprehensive study on regularisations in the 
European Union, which aims to analyse the impact of such measures and their 
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relationship to other types of migration policies (Baldwin-Edwards & Kraler, 
2009). Finally, it should be also underlined that Southern European countries 
have improved their ‘bad reputation’ in control matters. Firstly, they have 
strengthened their external control systems (Monzini et al., 2006; Carling, 
2007). Secondly, it has been proven that differences on this issue, between 
Southern and Northern European countries do not lie on the existence or not 
of irregular flows but on the way they manage their presence (Finotelli, 2009). 
Thirdly, by signing the European Pact of Immigration of September 2008 
where Member States agree «to use only case-by-case regularisations rather 
than generalised regularisations carried out nationally for humanitarian or 
economic reasons» (Doc. 13440/08)2 Southern European migration regimes 
have formally given up the ‘regularisation’ strategy. 
Despite this, evaluations of Mediterranean control regimes are still influ-
enced by the stereotype on ‘weak’ Southern European migration regimes, in 
which chaotic and unplanned regulation mechanisms seem to dominate. 
In addition, the debate on the effectiveness of regularisation programmes 
shows that there still is a substantial contradiction between the evaluation (and 
criticism) of regularisations and the lack of empirical evidence in favour of or 
against such processes. It is this very lack of useful empirical data that often 
prevents us from supplying satisfactory answers to the question on whether 
or not regularisations are an effective policy measure against irregular migra-
tion. Have regularisations contributed to stabilise foreign populations and 
consolidating the residence status of immigrants? Are they effective against the 
informal economy? Can we speak of any remarkable pull effect? And can they 
still be considered hallmarks of Southern European migration policy regimes? 
This paper intends to answer these questions using the Spanish and the 
Italian cases as comparative examples. Both countries have carried out several 
regularisation processes in the past twenty years. Since 1986, 1.2 and 1.4 mil-
lion immigrants have respectively been regularised in Spain and Italy. Therefore, 
these countries can be considered relevant examples to answer the aforemen-
tioned questions due to size of these regularisation processes. In the first part 
of this paper, we analyse the results of the Italian and Spanish r regularisation 
processes, as well as their effects on each country’s foreign population. Since the 
2005 Spanish regularisation and Italian 2002 regularisation, were the largest 
European mass regularisations ever, we will be particularly focusing on these in 
the second part of the paper. In the third section, we shall assess the effects and 
the future of regularisations as migration policy tools. In the process, we focus 
on a possible reduction of the irregularity rate, and on the so-called pull effect 
on further irregular flows. Finally, we insist on the role of regularisations in the 
analysed migration regimes and their control mechanisms. The paper’s final 
goal is to assess their real control potential beyond sterile myths on migration 
dynamics and migration control policies in Europe. 
2. This document is, however, not legally binding, so there are still no legal barriers to the 
execution of regularisation processes.  
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Regularisations in Europe
The italian case
Italy became a ‘new’ immigration country between the 1970s and the 1980s, 
after having been an emigration country for decades. Immigration legislation 
was restrictive from the very beginning, since this was the price which the ‘new’ 
immigration country and future Schengen member had formally to pay for 
its European membership (see Table 1). However, Italian policymakers did 
not ignore the need for foreign workers and introduced labour recruitment 
strategies such as annual entry quotas. According to the law, foreign workers 
had to be recruited before they entered the country of destination and were 
only admitted if a previous labour market control had demonstrated the una-
vailability of natives or citizens from ‘privileged’ countries to do the offered 
job. Such labour market checks, however, turned recruitment procedures into 
cumbersome and inefficient processes. Moreover, the number of available entry 
slots included in the annual quotas (‘decrees on flows’) often underestimated 
the real labour market necessities. 
Therefore, this inadequate immigration legislation, together with growing 
migration numbers and an expanding informal economy, stirred the increase 
in illegal migration (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009). As a result, most employ-
ers started hiring foreign workers who were already living in the country as 
irregular immigrants. In the 1990s, Italian governments used ‘decrees on flows’ 
to regularise a given number of irregular immigrants every year, and thus to 
‘correct’ the consequences of a dysfunctional migration regime (and a struc-
tural labour demand). In the same period, Italian governments carried out four 
mass regularisations, which were executed in parallel to national and European 
immigration regulations (Table 1). The fifth regularisation in twenty years was 
carried out in 2002 by the Italian government (2001-2006) chaired by Silvio 
Berlusconi. Interestingly, this regularisation, performed by a centre-right gov-
ernment, turned out to be the most successful one, with 702,000 applications 
and 634,728 residence permits issued. 
Table 1. Control policies in Italy and in Europe (1985-2002)
1985 1990 1995 1998 2002
First Schengen 
Agreement
Second Schengen  
Agreement
Schengen II  
enforcement  
(not in Italy)
Schengen II  
operative in Italy  
(01.04.98)
Continuation of the 
European restrictive 
course (Sevilla 2002)
Law 943/86 Law 39/90 Law 486/1995 Law 40/1998 Law 189/02
First  
Regularisation 
(105,000 migrants)
Second  
Regularisation 
(217,000 migrants)
Third  
Regularisation 
(244,000 migrants)
Fourth  
Regularisation 
(217,000 migrants)
Fifth  
Regularisation  
(634,000 migrants)
Source: Direct sources.
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Regularisation processes in Italy were not a novelty. Indeed, they are deeply 
embedded in the political culture and organisational structure of the Italian 
state. Regularisations have often been carried out in several other fields, most 
of which were in the building sector or to reduce tax evasion. Nevertheless, 
we can also find them in other less important sectors, such as that of the 
illegal property of archaeological findings or of exotic animals (Colombo & 
Sciortino, 2004). Except for the 1990 regularisation, they depended on the 
immigrant’s employment status, which meant that foreigners could regularise 
their stay if they could regularise their occupational status. However, the 2002 
regularisation was the only one that depended on the existence of a regular 
work contract and, above all, the applicant’s registration to the national Social 
Security System. Each regularisation was announced as an exceptional measure 
whose objective was to regularise as many immigrants as possible in order to 
solve the problem of irregular migration. 
In general, regularisations in Italy were very burdensome processes. Their 
implementation were complemented by administrative memos adding details 
or changing requirements in the course of the on-going process. Successful 
applicants were usually issued with a renewable two-year residence permit. 
Nevertheless, the status of regularised immigrants remained very unstable. This 
was not only due to the short duration of the residence permits and precari-
ous employment conditions but also to the discretionary power of the public 
officials who renew the permits. It can therefore be assumed that the prolonged 
renewal procedures, the precariousness of immigrants’ employment sectors and 
the frequency of short-term labour contracts might have favoured regularised 
immigrants’ ‘return to irregularity’.
Nevertheless, research conducted on this topic has shown that regularisa-
tions in Italy also seem to have contributed to the stabilisation of foreign popu-
lations, at least up to 2002. According to recent research results, more than 50 
per cent of migrants regularised between 1986 and 1998 still had a residence 
permit at the beginning of 2000. Moreover, the number of individuals that 
have applied to more than one regularisation programme -thus having reverted 
to an irregular status in the intervening years- is negligible (Carfagna, 2002). 
The number of residence permits issued between 1992 and 2000 increased 
from 649,000 to 1,341,000. More than 60 per cent of such permits were 
issued after the 1995 and 1998/1999 regularisations (Istat 2005). In addition, 
the spectacular increase in residence permits registered in 2004 (724,000 more 
than in 2003) was clearly due to the 2002 regularisation process (Table 2).
Similar results were also generated by the surveys of the Osservatorio region-
ale per l’integrazione e la multietnicità (Regional Observatory for Integration 
and Multiethnicity) of the Region Lombardy, the Italian region with the high-
est migrant rate. According to their 2004 survey, 98 per cent of the migrants 
interviewed in Lombardy who had obtained their permit through a regulari-
sation programme had never subsequently lost their legal status (Blangiardo, 
2004). Finally, it can be observed that the largest foreign communities living 
in Italy are also those at the top of the regularisation statistics. 
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Table 2. Foreign residents and stay permits issued (2001-2009)
Foreign residents Stay permits
2001 — 1,379,749
2002 — 1,448,392
2003 1,549,373 1,503,286
2004 1,990,159 2,227,567
2005 2,402,157 2,245,548
2006 2,670,514 2,286,024
2007 2,938,922 2,414,972
2008 3,432,651 2,063,127
2009 3,891,295 —
Source: Istat.
Table 3. Regularised immigrants and foreign population (2007) with a valid residence permit
Regularised migrants 
Main countries of origin  
(1986-2002)
Foreign population based 
on residence permits 
Main countries of origin 
01/01/2004
Foreign population based 
on residence permits 
Main countries of origin 
01/01/2007
Morocco  181,311  231,044  258,571
Romania  168,726  244,377  278,582
Albania  118,251  240,421  282,650
Ukraine  102,140  117,161  118,524
China  77,649  104,952  122,364
Philippines  59,592  76,099  76,413
Senegal  56,865  49,720  49,805
Tunisia  55,034  62,651  64,870
Ecuador  41,571  48,302  50,274
Serbia &  
 Montenegro
 36,094 —  55,701
Peru  35,831  48,827  52,133
Moldavia  30,121 —  50,308
Nigeria  26,417 —  28,074
Sri Lanka  27,507 —  44,957
Pakistan  27,711 —  52,133
India  27,124  49,157  57,220
Source: Based on Carfagna (2002) and Istat (2007) data.
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In sum, and considering the restrictive and dysfunctional entry and resi-
dence rules in Italy since the 1990s, we can assume that regularisations repre-
sented a major stabilisation channel since the majority of the initial residence 
permits issued in Italy were supplied after a regularisation process. In this way, 
regularisations paved the way for family reunion, which represented a stable 
entry channel into Italy in the past 15 years (Einaudi, 2007). 
Despite these positive effects, after 2002 the irregularity rate started to 
increase again (Ismu, 2007 & 2008). External observers ascribed this growth 
to the ‘pull effect’ of regularisations. In fact, some Italian scholars have referred 
to an increase in the activity of migrants’ networks in concomitance with the 
2002 regularisation (Ciafaloni, 2004; Pastore, 2004b; Semi, 2006). However, 
as Blangiardo & Tanturri (2004) suggested, ‘pull effects’ are quantitatively 
difficult to measure and, even though we cannot to a certain extent exclude 
such an effect, irregularity rate increases are often related to far more com-
plex dynamics. In this particular case, such increase was probably due to 
Berlusconi’s government decision to further reduce both the foreign work-
ers’ annual entry quotas and cooperation with sending countries (Ministero 
dell’Interno, 2007). In addition, lifting visa obligation for Romanian citizens 
favoured their free circulation within Europe and therefore the possibility they 
‘overstayed’ as irregulars in countries with weak internal control systems, such 
as Italy. As a matter of fact, it was particularly the percentage of Romanian 
irregular residents, which increased between 2002 and 2007 (Sciortino, 2007). 
In 2007, however, the irregularity rate dropped again, not least due to 
the fact that all Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants had become legal as a 
consequence of their European membership after 01/01/2007. In addition, in 
2006 Berlusconi’s government approved a so-called ‘maxi-decree’ on annual 
entry quotas, allowing the entry of 470,000 foreign workers. Nevertheless, 
the objective of the decree was not to allow ‘new’ workers to enter but to 
regularise irregular immigrants who were already living in Italy as overstayers. 
The maxi-decree was followed by two new bogus ‘decrees on flows’ in 2007 
and 2008, whereas a ‘more proper’ regularisation process —though limited to 
domestic and care workers— was carried out in 2009. However, these meas-
ures seem to have been less successful than former ones, since they were not 
only accompanied by a remarkable decrease in the number of applications posi-
tively evaluated but also in the number of residence permits eventually issued. 
According to Colombo (2009), such trend seems to be triggered not only by 
the poor performance of the Italian bureaucracy but also by changes in the 
type and dynamics of migration systems in which Italy is involved. Certainly, 
the aforementioned trend reveals that in Italy regularisations seem to have lost 
their former stabilisation function. However, the execution of such processes 
also shows that Italian governments still consider regularisations to be useful 
policy measures, despite a de facto weakening of their efficiency. This confirms 
the «high degree of path dependency of migration policies» in Italy (Pastore, 
2009) and poses the question on whether we are facing an Italian peculiarity 
or a persisting feature of the so-called ‘Mediterranean immigration model’. 
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The spanish case
The transition of Spain to an immigration country began between the 1980s 
and the 1990s. This transformation, however, was more a matter of rapidity 
than volume. Indeed, immigration grew rapidly but the volume of immi-
grants, at least in the 1990s, was modest, far from the immigration figures 
of traditional European receiving countries in the same period. It was only at 
the beginning of the 21st century that immigration experienced a spectacular 
upsurge, starting what has been coined as a ‘prodigious decade’ of immigra-
tion (Oliver, 2008). Within a very short period, the Spanish foreign popula-
tion came to represent 10 per cent of the total population. Nevertheless, the 
growth of foreign population and, in particular, the increase in foreign work-
ers, was not the result of an efficient immigration policy combining labour 
market demands and state policies. In fact, certain blindness towards the real 
Spanish labour market demands can be observed in Spanish legislation. From 
the beginning, Spain, like Italy, adopted a formally restrictive approach to 
the entry and residence of foreigners. And, like Italy, the inadequacy of its 
entry channels, together with a strong demand for foreign labour, created a 
mismatch between market demands and state regulations. In consequence, 
irregular migration was solidified as a structural component of the Spanish 
migration regime (Arango, 2000). In such a context, regularisations seemed 
to be the most useful way to «repair» the contradictions of the Spanish migra-
tion regime, in which irregularity and informality constantly fed each other. 
Since 1985, Spain has carried out six regularisations. As in the Italian case, 
each of these programmes was presented as an exceptional «one-off» measure. 
The first regularisation took place in 1985/1986, and was followed by others 
in 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001 and 2005. Most processes have targeted irregu-
lar workers; however, they have sometimes been extended to other migrant 
categories such as relatives (1996, 2000 and 2001), asylum-seekers (2000) or 
specific nationalities, e.g. Ecuadorians (2001) (Arango & Finotelli, 2009). 
The requirements for application were not always clear. A general condition, 
common to all processes, was that applicants had to prove they had been living 
in Spain prior to a certain date (reference date). The lack of a criminal record 
was another essential condition for most processes. In some cases, require-
ments for application included previous employment as a desirable aspect, 
but the only one making the residence permit dependent on the existence of a 
work contract and the registration of the foreign worker to the Social Security 
System was the 2005 regularisation. In contrast to previous processes, it was 
therefore the employer who had to apply for the regularisation of his or her 
employees. Legalisation was only applicable if the worker had been registered 
to the Social Security System and the first month’s dues had been paid. This 
is why the 2005 regularisation has been described by state officials as a «real» 
regularisation. Furthermore, applicants also had to prove that they had been in 
Spain for six months prior to the date the process started, i.e. before 8 August 
2004, and the only acceptable proof was official registration to the municipal 
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population registry. On top of this, they had to produce a clean criminal record 
in their country, obtainable from their embassies or consulates. 
Between 1986 and 2005, Spain regularised a total of almost 1.2 million 
immigrants. The 2005 regularisation was the most successful one, allowing the 
regularisation of 578,375 applicants. This considerably increased the size of 
the legal immigrant population in Spain. In fact, compared to 2004, the num-
ber of legal non-EU citizens increased by a total of 653,050. In addition, the 
number of foreign workers registered in the Social Security System increased 
to 1,757,081, that is to say, 616,655 more than in 2004.3 The 2005 regularisa-
tion therefore seemed to affect a large proportion of irregular immigrants living 
in Spain, contributing to the foreign population’s stabilisation. 
In general, the residence permits issued after a regularisation were valid for 
one year. This means that in Spain, as in Italy at the time, regularised immi-
grants had a precarious status, and were required to renew their permits regu-
larly. In addition, the process excluded a sizeable number of eligible applicants 
because they lacked the necessary documents, such as the official certificate 
of their registration to the municipal registry (Arango & Jachimowitz, 2005). 
However, the large number of immigrants who participated and obtained a 
residence permit remains striking. Furthermore, available data suggests that 
most of them could also renew their residence permit in the subsequent years. 
According to Table 4, the number of residence permits renewed between 2005 
and 2006 for the first time more than doubled (increasing from 300,454 to 
844,857), while initial residence permits decreased considerably. Even though 
we do not know the exact number of regularised immigrants who managed to 
renew their residence permits one year after the process, these figures suggest 
that most of the initial residence permits issued after the regularisation were 
renewed in the subsequent years.
Certainly, regularised immigrants are often more exposed than others to 
the risk of losing their regular status (Sciortino, 2004; Domingo et al., 2010). 
However, table 4 data allow us to assume that a significant segment of regu-
larised immigrants in Spain remained regular after their initial residence per-
mit had expired. This also confirms that the 2005 regularisation as suggested 
3. Data provided by the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration for 2004 and 2005 
(http://extranjeros.mtin.es/es/InformacionEstadistica/Anuarios/).
Table 4. Valid residence permits according to type of renewal
2005 2006 2007 2008
Initial 768,768 257,541 324,918 263,826
1st renewal 300,454 844,857 873,425 407,865
2nd renewal 414,900 331,941 271,925 638,330
Source: Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration.
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by other scholars in the past,4 contributed to reduce the irregularity rate in 
the short-medium term. On the other hand, regularisation detractors point to 
the fact that having a residence permit does not prevent immigrants from work-
ing illegally if internal controls are weak and there is a high labour demand in 
the informal sector. After the 2005 regularisation, the Spanish Social Security 
Institute monitored the occupational careers of all migrants regularised that 
year. According to a government follow-up, 461,319 of the regularisation-
related registrations were still valid in October 2006. This means that almost 
80 per cent of the regularised immigrants were still working legally at least one 
year after the regularisation process. On the other hand, these data also indicate 
that not all immigrants were still working in the same sector. In particular, a 
year later, a non-specified sector, which interviewed state officials identified as 
the domestic sector, had lost 104,193 regularised workers to the advantage of 
other sectors. Similar effects have also been observed in agriculture. According 
to our interviews with COAG, an important farmers’ association, only 10-20 
per cent of regularised immigrants were still working in the agricultural sector 
at the end of 2007. This statement perfectly fits Spanish and Italian researchers’ 
analyses identifying the domestic sector and agriculture as foreign workers’ main 
port of entry, which immigrants leave as soon as they have stabilised their legal 
residence (Zucchetti, 2004; Pumares, 2006; Rubin et al., 2008).
Unfortunately, after 2006, there are no further follow-ups on regularised 
immigrants’ labour market insertion. But observing the number of work per-
mits yearly issued since 2005, and especially the high number of second renew-
als issued in 2008, it can be assumed that the regularisation also contributed to 
employment stabilisation of a substantial proportion of regularised immigrants, 
since some of those who applied for a second renewal in 2008 had obtained 
their first work permit after the 2005 regularisation (Table 5). 
When the number of regular foreign residents in Spain is compared with 
the numbers of regularised immigrants in the past ten years, the function 
regularisations have as stabilisers becomes even clearer (Table 6).
4. See, for instance, Recaño & Domingo, 2005; Pajares, 2006; Cachón, 2007; Cebolla & 
Gonzalez, 2008.
Table 5. Working permits issued according to type of renewal1
2005 2006 2007 2008
Initial 644,305  103,467 222,561  68,818
1st renewal 129,082  621,464 108,325  117,215
2nd renewal 193,048  79,258 100,281  399,436
1.  Initial work permits are valid for one year, whereas first and second renewals are valid for 
two years. 
Source: Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration.
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Table 6 indicates that regularisations are likely to have permitted the 
legal inclusion and stabilisation of 43 per cent of the total foreign popula-
tion, in spite of the precariousness of the residence permits issued. In the 
long-term, the «stabilisation» effect of regularisations will be strengthened by 
family reunion processes: permits issued for family reunion increased from 7 
in 2000 to 128,161 in 2007. However, Table 6 also shows that the rate of 
regularised foreigners varies according to nationality. As a matter of fact, the 
percentage of regularised Bolivians, Romanians, Ecuadorians, and to a lesser 
extent, Colombians is fairly high. In contrast, the percentage of regularised 
Moroccans, Chinese and Peruvians is much lower. These differences might be 
explained by the fact that the most recent flows are always those most benefit-
ing from regularisations. For instance, Moroccans, Dominicans and Peruvians 
commenced migrating much earlier than Ecuadorians or Bolivians. At present, 
they can rely on ‘regular’ entry channels and are, therefore, less represented in 
the 2000 to 2005 regularisation processes. 
Additionally, such low figures might also be partially explained by contin-
gent factors in the countries of origin reducing flows or by specific regulations 
favouring legal entries (e.g. Peruvians had been included in the group of privi-
Table 6. Foreign population and regularised immigrants in Spain (2000-2006)
Regularised 
foreigners  
2000-2001-2005
Regular Non-EU 
foreigners  
31/12/2006
% of residents 
regularised
Total  1,019,997  2,360,804  43
Bolivia  43,197  52,587  82
Romania  127,586  211,325  60
Ecuador  199,152  376,233  52
Senegal  13,965  28,560  48
Ukraine  30,576  52,760  57
Pakistan  18,938  29,669  63
Bulgaria  31,469  60,174  52
Algeria  17,748  36,499  48
Colombia  101,474  225,504  44
Morocco  146,610  543,721  26
China  22,397  99,526  22
Dominican Republic 5,936  58,126  10
Peru  6,250  90,906  7
Source: Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration. 
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leged aliens due to a Dual Nationality Convention between Spain and Peru. 
This exempted Peruvian labour immigrants from the labour market check 
and reduced the attractiveness of irregular migration for this community). 
Apparently, visa regulations also played a very important role in ‘selecting’ 
flows over the years. The introduction in 1992 of visa obligation for Cuban, 
Peruvian and Dominican immigrants hampered irregular flows from these 
countries, and might explain why all three communities almost disappeared 
from the regularisation statistics up to 2000. The type of visa regulations, 
might explain the high presence of Romanian and Ecuadorian immigrants in 
the 2005 regularisation. Figure 1 shows the relationship between visa regula-
tions and the number of immigrants who register for the first time in a munici-
pality per year (variaciones residenciales). 
As can be seen in Figure 1, Romanians were the most favoured by visa 
regulations - their population rapidly rose after the 2002 abolition of visa 
obligation for Romanians citizens. Conversely, up to 2003 Ecuadorian annual 
inflows are very high, then, after the introduction of the visa obligation, they 
drop off abruptly. Similarly, Colombian immigrant inflows decreased after the 
introduction of visa obligation in 2001. Moroccan annual inflows, one of the 
oldest and largest foreign communities in Spain, do not show relevant varia-
tions up to 2003. The improvement of diplomatic relations between Morocco 
and Spain may have, however, favoured the relaxation of the visa policy and 
an increase in new entries from 2003/2004 onwards. Figures show how, at the 
beginning of the 21st century, weak (or inexistent) visa regulations favoured 
huge immigration flows, especially from Latin America, and later on from 
Figure 1. Evolution of first-time registrations in the Padrón (2000-2006). 
Source: Spanish National Statistical Institute. 
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Romania. Most of these ‘new’ immigrants remained in Spain irregularly until 
the regularisation of 2005, the outcome of which clealry reflects the ‘Latin 
Americanisation’ of the foreign population.
A closer look at the relationship between variaciones residenciales and visa 
policy may also help to assess the relevance of the so-called pull effect of regu-
larisations. Table 7 provides a more detailed overview of the foreigners who 
registered for the first time in the Padrón after their arrival to Spain.
As it can be observed, registrations by Colombians decreased considerably 
after the introduction of the 2001 visa obligation. The number of Ecuadorians 
also remains very high until 2003, after which it falls. On the one hand, these 
high figures, around the 2000/2001 regularisations, may suggest a ‘pull effect’. 
In both cases, however, the increase in registrations just before the introduction 
of a visa obligation might be more related to the upcoming visa obligation than 
to an expectation of being regularised. Similarly, the increase in registrations 
of Bolivian citizens between 2005 and 2006 might suggest a ‘pull effect’ of 
the 2005 regularisation. Here again, however, the rise may have more to do 
with the upcoming —April 2007— visa obligation. Indeed, between 2006 
and 2007 we observe a remarkable decrease in Bolivian citizens registration.
As far as Morocco is concerned, there is slight increase in Moroccan reg-
istrations after 2004. In this case, the ‘rumour’ of a regularisation might have 
increased the activity of Moroccan networks and favoured new entries, as 
occurred in Italy prior to the 2002 regularisation (Semi, 2004). Finally, the 
increase in Romanians after 2002 is a generalised phenomenon that cannot 
Table 7. First-time registration of foreigners in the Padrón (2001-2007)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Bulgaria  11,771  15,872  13,691  20,997  18,337  21,748  31,331
Romania  23,295  48,330  55,046  103,532  108,294  131,457  197,642
Ukraine  10,987  10,847  9,158  11,851  10,015  10,736  11,144
Morocco  39,517  40,172  41,171  73,380  82,519  78,512  84,978
Mali  725  844  1,391  4,803  3,278  4,300  3,378
Senegal  1,912  2,048  2,855  6,878  6,908  6,795  11,602
Ecuador  82,639  88,967  72,839  17,202  15,234  21,387  30,162
Peru  7,121  7,955  17,735  17,735  19,946  21,691  27,372
Colombia  71,220  34,235  11,121  21,502  24,945  35,621  41,725
Bolivia  4,863  10,625  18,226  44,049  44,895  77,755  51,797
China  5,231  5,692  20,296  20,296  18,406  16,882  20,394
Pakistan  1,789  1,782  9,351  9,351  12,439  8,222  10,645
Source: Spanish National Statistical Institute. 
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only be explained by the ‘rumour’ of a regularisation process since it is clearly 
related to new visa provisions. However, news about an upcoming regularisa-
tion may well have been a magnet factor in certain cases5. Migration flows to 
Spain since 2000 show that the alleged ‘pull effect’ regularisations supposedly 
have is only one of a complex combination of factors that could contribute to 
the reproduction of irregular migration systems. Therefore, the persistence of 
a certain rate of irregularity after 2005 (and the recent moderate increase in 
the case of Bolivian citizens) might be related to the persistence of ‘open’ visa 
regulations and to the fact that some immigrants might have also lost their 
residence permit due to crisis-driven unemployment. However, such an effect, 
may be less likely than in Italy, since when it comes to the renewal of residence 
permits for unemployed foreigners the Italian law is far more restrictive than 
the Spanish one. 
Explaining the function of regularisations as ex-post regulation tools 
Regularisations as ‘crisis management’ policy tools must, first of all, be consi-
dered as embedded in the dysfunctional mechanisms that have characterised the 
Spanish and Italian migration regimes in the past 20 years. Due to inadequate 
recruitment procedures, an extended inefficient economy and inefficient con-
trols, irregular migration became a constitutive factor of Southern European 
migration regimes. Regularisations were, however, a key tool to readjust the 
balance between ineffective state regulations and large flows of immigrants. 
Similar timing and implementation designs6 of Southern European regu-
larisation programmes and in particular the existence of a policy-transfer effect 
from Italy to Spain, suggests the existence of imitation mechanisms between 
the countries.7 However, similarities go far beyond mere imitation. Indeed, 
regularisations turned out to be one of the most important mechanisms to 
‘repair’ the inconsistencies in both migration regimes. Firstly, they enabled to 
regain control over the presence of irregular foreigners. Therefore, in systems 
where work place controls are traditionally weak, regularisations have come to 
represent an instrument of internal control (Sciortino, 1999). Secondly, they 
have contributed to stabilise foreign populations, since a large number of the 
regularised immigrants were subsequently able to keep the residence permit 
they obtained through regularisation. Finally, regularisations have permitted 
5. A recent study on migration mechanisms in the two Romanian communities of Luncavita 
and Feldru highlighted that regularisation processes indeed had a «pull effect». Most of 
the community members who moved to Spain were attracted by the ongoing regularisa-
tion —supported by strong social networks and, of course, an open visa policy (Elrick and 
Ciobanu, 2009).
6. Only a few formal differences regarding the requirement conditions can be observed. 
Compared to the Italian ones, the first Spanish regularisations  were also addressed to asy-
lum seekers and irregular family members. Nevertheless, their quantitative impact should 
have been limited as, at the beginning of the new century, both the number of asylum 
seekers and family reunion processes were still low.
7. For an analysis of the policy transfer effect between Italy and Spain also see Pastore (2008). 
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unwanted immigrants, the so-called ‘wanted but not welcome’ (Zolberg, 1987) 
immigrants, to become integrated in formal labour market structures. In spite 
of the absence of adequate migration programmes, regularisations have con-
tributed to meet the structural needs of the respective national economies, 
providing a posteriori necessary foreign labour when official admission policies 
failed. Obtaining a residence permit therefore favoured the mobility of immi-
grants from less to more attractive economic sectors. As formerly pointed out 
and both Italian and Spanish scholars have shown that domestic service and 
the agricultural sectors are the two main ‘ports of entry’ for immigrants who 
often change their type of employment as soon as they gain better residence 
conditions. In sum, as Christian Joppke (2005: 109) puts it for the case of 
France, regularisations clearly «stand for the primacy of the market over the 
state in controlling immigration flows».
In terms of political legitimation, regularisations had minor political and 
budgetary costs for both the Italian and Spanish governments. And yet, and 
in contrast to the events in Northern European countries, public acceptance 
of regularisations in Southern Europe was deeply embedded in the economic 
legitimation of immigration (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009). In addition, the 
possibility that regularised immigrants become unemployed does not pose a 
threat to Italian or Spanish welfare regimes, as their unemployment benefits 
are rather low or short-term fixed and universal social assistance is almost 
non-existent. Unemployment structure was another factor that might have 
favoured the acceptance of such processes usually affecting unskilled foreign 
workers. In fact, especially in Italy, the rate of unskilled or low-skilled workers 
in the unemployment statistics was quite low for years, since unemployment 
often affected well-educated young people awaiting better opportunities in 
the labour market. 
However, regularisations are still a Janus-faced policy measure. Firstly, 
regularisations never clean the slate of irregular immigrants completely because 
some of them are always left outside the process. Secondly, even though it 
is impossible to prove that there is an overall ‘pull effect’ between a given 
regularisation and irregular flow increases, it cannot be excluded that the peri-
odic implementation of regularisation affected immigrants’ perceptions and 
contributed to the development of certain expectations on the functioning 
mechanisms of Southern European migration regimes. In other words, in 
migration regimes characterised by periodic regularisations irregular immi-
grants probably expect to be regularised sooner or later. Finally, it is still 
unclear whether regularisations affect the way irregular and regular immigrants 
perceive the attractiveness of informal economy. The Romanian community 
living in Spain, for instance, might provide a useful example. The number 
of Romanians registered in the foreign population statistics of the Spanish 
Ministry of Immigration reached 715,750 in 2008, due to the E.U. enlarge-
ment. This figure is considerably higher than that of Romanians registered 
at the Social Security (227,690) at the end of the same year. This mismatch 
might be due to the fact that not all Romanian residents need to be registered 
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in the Social Security System. Unemployed immigrants or immigrant children, 
for instance, are not included in the former group. Furthermore, the gap may 
also be due do the high degree of circularity affecting Romanian migration sys-
tems. Despite having returned to Romania or moved on to another European 
country, Romanian immigrants might be still registered in Spain. In addition, 
the end of the limitation of free movement of workers from Romania and 
Bulgaria, lifted at the beginning of 2009, should also be taken into account to 
evaluate these figures. On the other hand, the mismatch could also portray a 
situation of ‘semi-compliance’8 of part of the Romanian community combin-
ing legal residence with irregular work. If we bear in mind that the number 
of Romanians officially registered in the Social Security System (274,082) in 
2009 was lower than figures on Romanians who, according to the Spanish 
Statistical Institute (445,490), declared to have a job, the former consideration 
seems to be pointing in the right direction. 
Are then regularisations effective policy tools? Empirical evidence shows 
that they are neither a panacea against irregular migration nor an inefficient 
policy tool. By contrast, it may be argued that they are positive measures if they 
are carried out efficiently and on an exceptional basis. But more importantly, 
they should be accompanied by reforms aimed at hampering the develop-
ment of irregular migration systems in the long term. In order to avoid the 
periodic need for mass regularisation processes, nation-states should, conse-
quently, increase their capacity to act directly on the «equation of irregular-
ity» variables. No government can tackle irregular migration without seriously 
improving its migration policies. As we have seen, both the Italian and Spanish 
immigration laws recognised from the very beginning of their immigration 
experience a certain need for low-skilled foreign workers. But attempts to 
develop new forms of active recruitment by breaking with the rigid country-of-
origin principle were only made at beginning of the new century. The Italian 
government started new ‘experimental’ forms of labour recruitment, such as 
the so-called sponsorship, whereby an Italian or a legally residing foreigner 
could be financed by regions, local administrations or unions. Such a ‘formal’ 
improvement was accompanied by an actual increase in the entry slots offered 
each year and an intensification of bilateral cooperation with major sending 
countries, turning Italy into a kind of ‘laboratory’ (Pastore, 2008) for immi-
gration policies. 
The Spanish government has also recently taken important steps towards 
establishing an efficient control system. The 2005 mass regularisation was 
part of a general legal framework to reduce irregular migration through new 
forms of legal recruitment. No. 2393/2004 regulation introduced more effi-
cient recruitment tools, such as ‘shortage lists’, and also used more effective 
quotas. This legislative reform was further supported by a general improve-
8. According to Ruhs and Anderson (2006:2), ‘semi-compliance indicates a situation where 
a migrant is legally resident but working in violation of some of the conditions attached to 
the migrant’s immigrant status’.  
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ment in border controls and labour market controls to combat the most 
important magnet for irregular migration – the informal economy. However, 
at the same time, the government recognised that it had little chances of 
achieving zero irregular migration. Therefore, this new Regulation introduces 
a presently on-going regularisation formula, such as arraigo, ‘correcting’ irregu-
larity on an individual basis. The implementation of the reform did benefit 
from a spectacular economic growth that did not only legitimate the largest 
ever regularisation carried out in Spain but also led to new recruitment schemes 
for foreign workers. Without doubt, what remains unclear is whether the 
Spanish migration regime can also be stabilised in times of economic crisis. 
In 2008, as a consequence of the crisis, the Spanish government reduced the 
slots provided by the contingente and the types of jobs included in the ‘shortage 
lists’. In fact, the Spanish government did not reform the existing labour entry 
channels, but merely reduced the annual available slots. 
In this respect, we can determine a major difference between the Spanish 
and the Italian cases. The 2002 Italian mass regularisation was not part of a 
‘positive’ reform of the immigration law. In fact, the Bossi-Fini law, which 
restricted the access to legal entry channels, accompanied its implementation. 
Restrictiveness in this case was a political issue and the result of a highly polar-
ised public debate on immigration (Pastore, 2010). As a consequence, ‘new’ 
irregular migration systems, that needed to be corrected by ‘hidden’ regularisa-
tions, developed. In this respect, and in contrast to Spain, the Italian govern-
ment took a big step back to the past by returning to old ex-post strategies 
where each annual entry ceiling slots are adapted to the number of applications 
received from existing irregular immigrants. Spain, however, maintains its 
‘third’ way by individually correcting irregularity through arraigo, which is a 
novelty in the Southern European panorama. Even if the number of residence 
permits issued through arraigo has been increasing year on year 9, their effect, 
at least until 2009, was rather limited in comparison to the ‘generous’ flow 
decrees approved by the Italian government since 2006. For the moment, 
it seems that the reform, together with control increases, have had positive 
effects on irregularity reduction.10 Nevertheless, irregularity may deteriorate 
due to the economic crisis. Some observers actually fear that, as residence per-
mits cannot be renewed without proving the existence of a job, most recent 
immigrants could lose them (Domingo et al., 2010). This could particularly 
affect those immigrants with initial residence permits or first renewal ones. It 
is still however impossible to forecast the extent to which the irregularity rate 
will increase and how governments will react to it. The fact is that the crisis 
will not last forever, and that both Italy and Spain have a clear structural need 
 9. According to the most recent data from the Ministry of Labour and Immigration the 
number of permits issued through arraigo increased from about 7,200 in 2006 to 56,000 
in 2008. 
10. In this respect, see recent estimates provided by Gonzalez-Enriquez, 2009 and Echeverria, 
2010. 
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for foreign workers, particularly in the service sector. New forms of labour 
recruitment that render the use of ex-post regulations unnecessary are there-
fore required. Nonetheless, the search for a suitable labour recruitment model 
is not an easy task, particularly with regard to its implementation within the 
present European migration context. From this perspective, the main issue 
does no longer seem to be whether or not regularisations are effective tools, 
but whether Southern European migration regimes will be able to implement 
more efficient labour immigration policies in the time to come. 
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